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1.

Introduction
Austerity has become the leitmotif of the period following the global financial crisis and 'Great Recession' since 2008 (Blyth 2013 , Smaghi 2013 . The international rise of what Schäfer and Streeck (2013: 9-10) term the "austerity or consolidation state" is apparent. The restructuring of the roles, rationales, institutional and territorial architectures of states has been integral in the attempts of actors in governments internationally to respond to economic shocks, downturn and recovery, financial system fragility and volatility, rising levels of private and public indebtedness, sovereign debt crises, and international geopolitical-economic turmoil. Specific actors in governments and international institutions have articulated particular diagnoses of such ills and their cures including: the European Union, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund-led bail-out programmes imposed in Greece, Ireland and Portugal (Fraser et al. 2013) , deficit reduction in the UK (Kitson et al. 2011) , and efforts to combine fiscal tightening and stimulus in America (Young and Sobel 2011) and France (Holland and Portes 2013) .
Amidst these tumultuous times, research is seeking to conceptualise and interpret the governance geographies of austerity (see, for example, Donald et al. 2014 , Hadjimichalis 2011 , Jones 2014 , Kitson et al. 2011 , Peck 2012 . Advancing this agenda, the purpose here is to address gaps in understanding and strengthen conceptual frameworks and theoretical explanations of how, why and in what forms austerity states are constructed by actors in particular political-economic contexts and geographical and temporal settings, how and by whom they are articulated and pursued, and how they are worked through public policy areas and their institutional and territorial architectures. The empirical focus is explaining the austerity state initiated and configured by actors in the Conservative and Liberal Democrat Coalition Government in the UK from 2010 and the abolition and closure of the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) responsible for economic development in England from the late 1990s.
The specific contributions are threefold. First, a more qualitative and plural conception of austerity states is developed to question singular and/or monolithic notions of state types and their transitions, and better reflect the particularities of how such state projects are constructed by actors and unfolded within specific geographical political-economic variegations of capitalism. Particular austerity states are somewhat fluid, unstable and temporary -even at times contingent -political projects configured in certain spatial and temporal settings by multiple actors at different institutional and geographical levels through their construction of discursive and often contested rationales, and their uneven, partial and messy attempts to implement them. Second, a more geographically sensitive approach to austerity and appreciation of (re)scaling are detailed to incorporate and extend beyond the predominantly national frame and decentralising narratives deployed in current accounts.
Austerity states are unfolding in geographically uneven ways across territorial scales and relational networks, involving multiple actors and multi-scalar articulations over time and space. Last, a historically literate interpretation of institutional dismantling is advanced better to explain the politics and restructuring of institutional landscapes by actors within austerity states. Notions of straightforward and tidy transitions between institutional and territorial architectures are questioned as the histories of institutional establishment and elements of change and continuity persist and intertwine, establishing legacies and ramifications that pattern institutional evolution and emergence.
2.
Austerity states, institutional dismantling and the governance of subnational economic development
While austerity has become pervasive internationally as a treatment for economic recovery and reform in post-crisis states (Kitson et al. 2011) , actors in governments have constructed and are enacting particular versions of austerity projects, sometimes with the involvement of external and supranational institutions. Although varied in their articulation and implementation, some common features of austerity are apparent across different geographical, temporal and political-economic settings internationally: rapid reduction of public debt and deficits through reducing public expenditure and/or raising taxes; the construction of narratives of fiscal consolidation and stability to maintain or enhance national credit ratings and instil international investor community confidence in sovereign debt; state restructuring and reorganisation of its institutional and territorial apparatus, policies, public services and employment; public sector wage freezes and/or reductions and pension reforms; and, echoing 'crowding-out' arguments (Bacon and Eltis 1976) , reducing the relative size of the state in the economy to enable the private sector to generate investment and jobs for economic growth and recovery (Hadjimichalis 2011 , Harvey 2010 , Kitson et al. 2011 , Schäfer and Streeck 2013 , Whitfield 2013 ).
The form, purpose and character of states has changed in the emergent context toward the "austerity" or "consolidation" state:
governments, at the prodding of 'financial markets', jointly try to turn the tax and debt state that existed before 2008 into an austerity or consolidation state defined by balanced budgets and a (gradual) decline in public indebtedness (Schäfer and Streeck 2013: 9-10 ). Schäfer and Streeck (2013) explain that two constituencies have emerged to enable and entrench the austerity state. First is the 'people' who are reluctant to pay more taxes, even for higher quality public provision, and cede more fiscal power to states. The people constituency is focused at the national level and comprises citizens as voters in periodic elections, shaping public opinion, loyal to particular political groupings, and broadly satisfied with levels of public services. The second constituency is the 'markets'. This grouping is international and comprises investors and creditors with claims on state and other assets, engaged in continual auctions of buying and selling, and sensitive to interest rates, confidence and state debt levels and service. In Schäfer and Streeck's (2013: 17) view, the people and markets have reinforced the government and politics of "long-term institutionalized policies of austerity".
Differing interpretations have emerged in geographical readings of the austerity state and its governance. For Harvey (2010) , it represents the reinforcement of the neoliberal governance of capital accumulation, marked by fiscal crises of the state and further reductions in the social wage. Indeed, following the 'Great Recession', states are interpreted as having reconstructed and accelerated neoliberalisation, redoubling its intensity and reach through state restructuring, bank bail-outs, partial and wholesale nationalisations, and stimulus programmes (Peck 2012) . Crouch (2011: 115) sees the emergence of "privatised Keynesianism" after the economic crisis of the early 1970s in advanced economies, characterised by extensive state support of deregulated finance and private debt to support consumption, and bemoans the "strange non-death" (Crouch 2011: vii) of neoliberalism following the late 2000s crisis and recession. Further rounds of state rescaling are seen as being unleashed in the wake of the crisis (Lobao et al. 2009 ), unfolding in ways distinctive from previous eras characterised by decentralisation from national to sub-national levels (Brenner 2004) .
Given that work theorising austerity and specifically the governance geographies of austerity states is in its infancy (Donald et al. 2014) , several key issues warrant attention. First, certain accounts have veered toward framing a linear transition from a tax and debt state to an austerity or consolidation state. While Schäfer and Streeck (2013: 9) acknowledge the role of agency and difficulties in government actors "trying to turn" old into new state forms, this approach raises several concerns. It risks treating each state conception as a singular and/or monolithic entity and gives limited attention to the blurring and/or overlaps between state types. And, it pays insufficient attention to the extent, nature, direction, timing and geographies of any transition in state forms. A way of addressing such points lies in the 'qualitative state' (Block 1994) . Marking a break with traditional 'quantitative' views of the extent of state intervention in the economy, the 'qualitative' reading interprets "a complex and heterogeneous state apparatus …engaged in constant interplay with non-state institutions and agents, including those from other nations, in an irresolvable contest over accumulation" (O'Neill 1997: 290) . The qualitative state focuses upon historical evolutions in the forms, nature, purposes and consequences of state actors and agency as well as their roles, strategies, capacities, resources, structures and (re)organisation -all of which are inescapably spatial (Pike and Tomaney 2009 ).
Conceiving of the qualitative state frames a plural rather than singular conception of austerity states, reflecting their characteristic features as well as the particularities of their construction by actors, emergence and unfolding within specific geographical and temporal variegations of capitalism (Peck and Theodore 2007) . Whereby generalised and even paradigmatic ideas such as austerity get translated, configured and mobilised in fluid, unstable and temporary political projects and policy programmes by actors in particular national and institutional political-economic contexts (Kus 2006) . The qualitative state focuses analysis and explanation upon how the multiple actors -what Jones et al. (2004: 89) term "state personnel" -involved at different institutional and geographical levels and in relational networks diagnose state problems and conceive of austerity as the solution, articulate its rationales and priorities, mobilise coalitions of state as well as non-state actors (e.g. commentators, journalists, policy analysts) to support and do its work, communicate it to various audiences, and try to deliver it through individual and institutional agency and policy. Rather than conceiving of some kind of linear and/or mechanical transition toward any wholly new state type, the central tasks are interpreting and explaining the degree, nature, timing and geographies of the emergence and governance of austerity states.
Second, the emergence of austerity states has been dominated by analysis based on the national frame of the nation state. Echoing the "methodological nationalism" of the 'Varieties of Capitalism' approach (Peck and Theodore 2007: 763) , work has primarily focused upon national governments, especially in Europe (see, for example, Schäfer and Streeck 2013) .
Limited attention has been given to the sub-national scale and then only to the local state (Lowndes and Pratchett 2012) . This national concern is vital but risks overlooking the uneven geographical unfolding and implications of austerity states in and across other geographical scales and relational networks. While much of the locus of authority and power to construct and enact austerity may reside amongst actors in the governing party and state apparatus at the national level, explaining the ways in which actors articulate, mediate and work through the national together with other territorial levels and relational circuits of the state are critically important. Such governance geographies of austerity are being acknowledged in the formative literature. In more spatially sensitive work, cities and urbanism have been the focus to date (Davidson and Ward 2014 , Donald et al. 2014 , Peck 2012 , although other local and regional scales of analysis are emerging (Beatty and Fothergill 2014 , Clarke and Cochrane 2013 , Kitson et al. 2011 . Evidence suggests: austerity policies have played out at multiple scales, but it seems that this current round of austerity is peculiarly local in nature...broader national policies have been translated into a diverse landscape of austerity with some cities and regions more affected than others (Donald et al. 2014: 5, 4) . Peck (2012: 628) , for example, has documented the geographical differentiation of the "extreme economy" of austerity at the sub-national scale of city, local and state governments in the US. Engaging the qualitative and plural conception of austerity states can benefit from such a geographically sensitive approach, appreciative of the different directions and manifestations of (re)scaling, that incorporates, complements and extends beyond the national frame.
Third, work is only just beginning to analyse the ways in which and implications of how actors in austerity states have sought to engage with existing state forms in efforts to contract or shrink the state, rationalising its role, purpose and structures through institutional restructuring (Flinders and Skelcher 2012, Tonkiss and Skelcher 2015) . Existing work has focused on national level welfare state reform (Streeck and Thelen 2005) , directing attention to short and long-term expenditure reductions, programme and spending reorganisation, and systemic and programme retrenchment (Pierson 1994) . Processes of dismantling can be discerned through which state institutional arrangements are abolished, closed down and removed from the landscape through the agency of state and, often, non-state actors (Pike et al. 2015) . Dismantling involves substantial effort, time, resources and (un)foreseen difficulties and costs that create legacies which pattern institutional evolution. Such challenges are amplified and sharpened in the financially straightened context of austerity projects as government departments lose experienced staff and struggle for resources. Complex and uncertain processes of state dismantling raise questions about how to disentangle and explain institutional operation and effects in specific geographical and temporal settings. How institutional establishment, legacies and trajectories inflect and shape their evolution in the context of particular state forms warrants historically literate approaches. 
The geographies and histories of institutional antecedents: the introduction and evolution of the RDAs in England
Reflecting the geographically sensitive and historically literate approach to explaining their demise, it is important to situate the RDA era in England within an unfolding trajectory of unsettled institutional arrangements for economic development governance, oscillating between regional and local forms in the post-war period (Pike et al. 2015) . Second, institutional geographies prefigured the evolution of the RDAs as they were established in every region in England. Contrary to the European model of establishing RDAs only in economically weaker regions (Bellini et al. 2012 ), the Labour Government followed the recommendation of its Regional Policy Commission (1996) . Inspired by ideas from New Economic Geography and Urban Economics that government commitments to reduce spatial inequalities were inefficient and counter-productive, RDA establishment followed the endogenous development model and its emphasis upon building regional institutional capacity (Agnew 2015) . Articulated in the metaphor of "all parts of all our regions firing on all cylinders" (Stephen Byers, then Industry Secretary, quoted in Wintour 2001: 1), RDAs were created in all English regions including London and the prosperous parts of the East and South East ( Figure 2 ). Concerns were expressed that this geographically undifferentiated approach was "treating unequals equally" and "hardly a recipe for promoting equality" by reducing disparities in regional economic growth rates (Morgan 2002: 804) . The political map of England meant especially the Conservative-led local government in southern and eastern regions viewed the new RDAs with suspicion and even hostility as unaccountable creatures of the Labour Government with "no regional identity and uniformity…strange geography…taking power and influence away from them…the RDAs were doomed from the start…once the decision was made to give all regions a RDA" (Former RDA Chair, Authors'
Interview, 2014) (Table 2) .
Last, the London Development Agency (LDA) was distinct and sat within different governance arrangements involving the Mayor, Greater London Authority (GLA) and London Assembly (LA). These more democratically accountable state structures as well as London's greater economic development potential meant the LDA evolved along a different trajectory from the other RDAs, culminating in its separate abolition arrangements.
The emergent austerity state and the politics of the critique of the RDAs
In Pushed by city leaders with greater "political nous" and connections than the RDAs, this changing institutional and geographical focus meant "some of the writing was on the wall before you got to 2010" (Former RDA Chairman, Authors' Interview, 2014). Constructions and articulations of particular austerity state projects are not fixed and stable entities that unfold inevitably; they are fluid and unstable endeavours that certain actors attempt to initiate, establish momentum for, and push through often amidst doubt, disagreement and dissent. Indeed, the initial austerity discourse in the Coalition Agreement left an opening for RDA retention and reform in supporting: "the creation of Local Enterprise Partnerships…to replace Regional Development Agencies…These may take the form of the existing RDAs in areas where they are popular" (HM Government 2010: 10). However, as the crisis rhetoric was ramped-up to propel and reinforce the austerity imperative and the Conservatives grasped the unique opportunity to undertake irrevocable state contraction and rationalisation, the abolition of all the RDAs was formally announced in the 'Emergency Budget' in June 2010.
As part of the state's 'strategic selectivity' in prioritising restructuring and deficit reduction (Jones 1997) , the Government launched a review of public bodies. Appealing to Schäfer and Streeck's (2013) people constituency of the austerity state by seeking to abolish unaccountable bodies spending tax payers' money, the review was initially dubbed a 'bonfire of the QUANGOS' capable of generating estimated savings of over £2.5bn. As an institutional legacy from the Labour government, RDAs were prominent QUANGOs ripe for abolition by the Coalition Government.
Articulating particular definitions of 'decentralisation', 'localism' and 'rebalancing' for the restructuring of economic development governance, the Coalition Government's 'Local Growth' agenda sought "a fairer and more balanced economy that is not so dependent on a narrow range of economic sectors…driven by private sector growth", and "has new business opportunities that are more evenly balanced across the country and between industries" (BIS 2010a: 5). Prescott's regional project was characterised as "too centralised" (BIS 2010c: 27), over-emphasised planning and "failed as it went against the grain of markets. Regional and other strategies stifled natural and healthy competition between places and inhibited growth"
(BIS 2010a: 7). Then Secretary of State for CLG, Eric Pickles, argued:
If you want to rebuild a fragile national economy you don't strangle business with red tape and let bloated regional quangos make all the decisions. Urgent action is needed to rebuild and rebalance local economies…The solution needs to be local…By giving up central control we will put democratic accountability back into the local economy making it responsive to the needs of local business and local people (quoted in BIS 2010b: 1).
The Coalition Government's 'Local Growth' agenda involved, first, shifting powers to business, local government and community actors at the local level through the invitation to form 'Local Enterprise Partnerships' (LEPs) so that "where the drivers of growth are local, East and the rest of England is as wide today as when RDAs began their work. That, by any measure, is a failed policy". As lead regional economic development institutions, RDAs were responsible for delivering PSA 2 for their sponsor departments BIS, CLG and HM Treasury.
Yet, each RDA's statutory purpose was to increase economic growth in their regional economy not reduce the gap in growth rates between regional economies. RDAs had other specific and broader accountabilities too that sat uneasily with PSA 2: departmental guidance; 'State of the Region' and 'Activity' indicators, tiered objectives, targets and milestones; and Regional Economic Strategies. Controlling less than 1% of total public expenditure within their regions (Table 3) , it was considered unrealistic to expect RDAs to exert much influence upon longstanding "structural differences" in geographies and levels of economic growth (Senior BIS Official, Authors' Interview, 2014) and, in practice, PSA 2 was recognised as aspirational and a means to focus central government attention on regional issues. BIS (2010c: 26) even accepted "substantial limits in how geographically balanced an economy can become" and how "the increase in economic disparities seems long-term and linked to globalisation".
Third, the state rescaling project condemned the RDA geography of Government Office
Regions as an inappropriate spatial scale because it was "based on administrative regions that did not always reflect real functional economic areas" (BIS 2010a: 13) . Underpinned by the emphasis of New Economic Geography and Urban Economics upon facilitating external economies of agglomeration, 'functional economic areas' (FEAs) "over which the relevant market operates" were preferred for the new LEP geographies "to deliver economic development activities at the most appropriate level to maximise their impact" (BIS 2010c: 29) . RDAs were at best groupings of FEAs, simply due to their size, and many deployed subregional structures that recognized FEAs such as city-regions. Indeed, reflecting the intractability of matching institutional structures to inherently shifting economic geographies (Jones 2014) , over half of the 39 LEPs have boundaries that are difficult to reconcile with recognized FEAs (Table 4) . Demonstrating the mixing of technocracy and politics in the austerity state, BIS and CLG (2010) acknowledged this mismatch and noted that in assessing potential LEP boundaries they considered other qualitative and more subjective factors including business leadership, local authority support, value added and ambition. were an "unnecessary and expensive layer of bureaucracy that stifle genuine private enterprise". Detailing how they "shared a combined single pot budget of £21bn", employed "around 3,000 staff" (Tables 5 and 6 ), BIS (2010a: 18, 13) concluded RDAs and the regional tier "involved significant complexity and duplication of responsibilities, which led to increased costs to the public purse". In the Coalition's austerity state, it was considered "no longer possible to fund the RDAs or other comparable bodies at their previous level" (BIS 2011:1).
However, central government actors offered no yardsticks against which to assess claims of over-generous funding, profligacy, waste, and over-staffing.
Fifth, as anathema to the Coalition's ambitions for decentralisation and localism as NDPBs, BIS (2010a: 7) claimed RDAs lacked local accountability and "local partners did not feel empowered to lead action to improve economic growth". Further, RDAs were portrayed as remote, unresponsive and "largely ignored the knowledge and the expertise" of the private sector, local authorities and local communities (BIS 2010a: 7). RDAs' joint role in statutory planning sharpened accountability concerns, especially in politically hostile southern regions.
RDA leaders argued they were "much more in the goldfish bowl than some government Involving organisations across England, over 3,000 staff, £1.2bn of programme commitments and over £500m of land assets and liabilities, "the orderly, cost effective, solvent and compliant closure of the eight RDAs outside London" was a "significant challenge" for BIS officials and RDA staff especially in the context of austerity (BIS 2012: 5) . This state restructuring was decided upon and forced through despite previous assessments of institutional dismantling identifying poor value for money because of unclear objectives, limited monitoring of costs and benefits, and poor implementation planning (NAO 2012).
As centralist and localist tensions buffeted the rescaling plans in the Government's austerity project, 'Local Growth' agenda and coalition politics between Ministers, several RDA functions were considered "best led nationally" ( Government identified "a number of current functions provided by RDAs that will simply stop" (BIS 2010a: 17): regional economic and spatial strategies, Grants for Business Investment, regional workforce skills strategies, and selected sectoral activities.
In the sharpened context of austerity, the disposal, sale and transfer of RDA assets and liabilities were critical to the financial outcomes of the transition and closure programme. The asset base was valued at around £500m, one third of which was land and property holdings.
One fifth was released for sale at 'market value' in early 2011. While local authorities had first refusal, purchases had to be at "full market value" with no "gifting" of properties through asset transfer or deferred "buy now, pay later" deals (Werran 2011: 1) . In London, LDA assets were Further on-going issues include: the labour market impacts of the redundancies of over 3,000 former RDA staff since less than 500 were transferred to new roles (BIS 2012); the splintered knowledge base and networks discarded through redundant staff and information systems; loss of experience and coordination across functions (BIS 2011: 2); written-off investment in staff training and research; costs and uncertainties dealing with RDAs during closure; disruption and gaps in service delivery (BIS 2011); and, the new LEPs starting economic development strategy afresh in rescaled geographies (Pike et al. 2015) .
Conclusions
Advancing the governance geographies of austerity research agenda, the purpose here has been to strengthen conceptual and theoretical frameworks to explain how, why and in what forms austerity states are constructed by actors in particular political-economic settings and geographical and temporal contexts, how and by whom they are expressed and enacted, and and, hampering the achievement of desired public policy outcomes. 
